Turkish invasion of Cyprus, July 20, 1974
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| Bombing of Famagusta during the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1974. the photo was published in newspapers of the time |
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| Greek Cypriot prisoners were transferred to Adana camps in Turkey |
Around 150,000 people (over a quarter of the total population and a third of Greek-speaking Cypriots) became refugees. A year later, approximately 60,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from the free southern areas to the northern areas controlled by Turkish forces. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared, recognized only by Turkey. The international community considers the territories of the TRNC as an area of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish forces. The occupation is still considered illegal, while talks for a solution to the Cyprus issue continue.
Historical background
From 1960 to the coup
The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 and, according to its Constitution, was a bi-communal state. In 1960, Cyprus had 573,566 inhabitants, of which 441,656 were Greek Cypriots (77%) and 104,942 (18.3%) Turkish Cypriots and 26,968 (4.7%) others (Maronites, Armenians). The Hellenic Force of Cyprus (ELDYK) was established in Cyprus on 16 August 1960 with 950 men and the TURDYK with 650. The ELDYK settled in its camp outside Nicosia on the road to Gerolakkos.
The first years of the Republic of Cyprus were difficult since they were characterized by the intercommunal riots of 1963, the isolation of Turkish Cypriots in areas (encapsulation), the arrival of various military forces and the creation of paramilitary organizations.
Inter-communal unrest and the advent of UNFICYP
In November 1963, Makarios submitted his 13 points for the amendment of the Constitution with the aim of softening the bi-communal nature of the state. This led to a political crisis, the Turkish Cypriots moving into enclaves and the intercommunal riots of 1963. Paramilitary nationalist organizations of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were active in the intercommunal riots. More specifically, the Greek Cypriots had formed the EEC (National Organization of Cyprus), better known as the Akrita Organization, at the end of 1961. Before that, the Turkish Cypriots had formed the TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, Turkish Resistance Organization). The head of the EEC was the Minister of the Interior Polykarpos Giorkatzis and the deputy leader was the Minister of Labor and Social Insurance Tassos Papadopoulos. "Chief of Staff" was the MP of the Patriotic Front, Nikos Kosis. Turkey supported their enclaves financially and with military equipment.
On March 4, 1964, the UN decided to establish a Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) to maintain peace in Cyprus.
Creation of the National Guard with Greek Officers and the secret arrival of a Greek division
On February 25, 1964, it was decided to create the National Guard, a kind of voluntary National Guard. The basis of its creation was the "deputy headquarters" of the "Akrita Organization". Important for the National Guard was the "Basic order no. 1" and provided for dual leadership in all staffs of the volunteer National Guard: a Greek Cypriot and a Hellenic officer. Voluntary participation, however, created problems and so, on March 13, 1964, at a meeting in Kastri under the Prime Minister of Greece, George Papandreou, he was put in charge of the established Special Joint Staff of Cyprus (EMEK), which aimed to "take charge of all military matters through Cyprus", general Georgios Grivas. At the same time, the Military Administration of Cyprus (SDIK) was created in Cyprus, which took orders from EMEK, while at the same time it was decided to send a secret Greek division to protect the island. By June 1964, the National Guard was created.
Acheson Plan (dual union with ~10% in Turkey)
The mediator on the Cyprus issue, former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, submitted a plan (two almost identical versions were presented) in 1965 which provided for the establishment of a Turkish base against sovereignty in a wide territorial zone on the Karpathian peninsula equal to 10%-11 % of the island's territory in exchange for the union of the rest of Cyprus with Greece. For the Turkish Cypriots who would not move to the Turkish zone, extensive self-government was foreseen in cantons within the Greek zone. It was a solution that came closer to the concept of dual union, the distribution of the island between Greece and Turkey. This solution was considered radical and definitive from the American perspective as it placed Cyprus under the control of two NATO member states and at the same time eliminated a focus conflict between allies in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey, however, did not accept leasing and demanded sovereignty. Not even Makarios accepted the plan and it was abandoned.
The regime of April 21 undermines Makarios, the founder of EOKA II
The regime of April 21, desiring the union, was moving in the direction of undermining the blessed regime. In November 1967, Grivas attempted against the Turkish Cypriot village of Kofinou, which caused international pressure on Athens and led to the final withdrawal of the Greek military forces sent there. In the spring of 1968, a series of intercommunal talks began on the subject of the internal structure of the Republic of Cyprus that came close to an agreement. In the same year, Makarios was re-elected to the presidential office.
In 1970 there was an assassination attempt against Makarios, whose politics were rewarded in the parliamentary elections of the same year. Since the previous year, the National Front had started to operate on the island. In 1970, Polykarpos Georgatzis, who had been linked to the attempt against Makarios, was also murdered.
At the beginning of autumn 1971, George Grivas returned to Cyprus and created EOKA II.
In 1972, the "ecclesiastical coup" unfolded. Three Cypriot metropolitans, demanding that Makarios resign from his secular office (of the president of the Republic), deposed him as archbishop in 1972. Ultimately Makarios prevailed as the major Synod deposed them in 1973.
In October 1973 there was a new assassination attempt against Makarios. After the death of Grivas, EOKA II, which was directly dependent on the Junta of Athens, took action against Makarios.
In July 1974, Makarios requested the withdrawal of the Greek officers of the National Guard, as, according to information he had, a coup against him by officials controlled by the Athens Junta was considered possible.
The coup
The Junta of Athens, under Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, believed that Makarios was no longer pursuing Union policy, and was preparing plans to overthrow him. In March 1974, the Cypriot Intelligence Service discovered EOKA II documents which documented plans for a coup d'état aided by the Athens Junta. On July 2, 1974, Makarios demanded the resignation of the Greek officers who were members of the Cypriot National Guard. The Junta of Athens then ordered a coup d'état to overthrow Makarios, who with his policy was moving away from the goal of the Cyprus-Greece Union. On July 15, the coup d'état took place in Cyprus, by the National Guard. Archbishop Makarios escaped and, on July 19, took part in the UN Security Council meeting, where he denounced the Athens Junta for invasion. Intense consultations followed in Athens and Ankara, with the US Deputy Secretary of State Joseph Cisco informing the Hundred regime (after talks he had in Ankara) that Turkey would not accept any change in the balance of power in Cyprus in favor of Greece. But Ioannidis and his Junta were undeterred.
July 15 - Start of Coup, fighting with Reserve
On July 15, at 8:15 in the morning, the coup took place. Units of the National Guard bombarded the presidential palace, which was defended by Police forces, called "Reserve". Makarios escaped to Paphos and announced via radio that he was alive. [[Nikos Samson] was appointed President of the new Government. That same afternoon it appeared that the coup had finally prevailed, with a death toll of 91 and 250 wounded.
July 16 - Fears of Turkish Cypriots - Escape of Makarios
On July 16, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot media began airing the concerns of Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas about the nature and intentions of the coup regarding union with Greece or persecution of the Turkish Cypriots. The coup regime assured that no one would move against the Turkish Cypriot enclaves.
On July 16, Makarios left Cyprus, via the English military bases. Stopping at Malta, he arrived at night in London.
July 17 - Makarios in England
On July 17, Makarios met British Prime Minister Wilson. The British Prime Minister, after the meeting he had with Archbishop Makarios, received the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, who went with a large escort of military chiefs of staff, ministers and others. Makarios asked the British government to maintain his recognition as the elected president of the Republic of Cyprus. Ecevit suggested that the coup had characteristics of an invasion. In the afternoon, Makarios flew to the USA in order to prepare to attend an upcoming meeting of the Security Council
July 18 - Cisco warns of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus
In the meantime, at around 11:00, the American Deputy Secretary of State Joseph Cisco and the Deputy Secretary of National Defense Ellsworth had arrived in Athens where, accompanied by the ambassador in Athens, Henry Taska, they visited the Prime Minister of the Junta, Adamantios Androutsopoulos, in private talks. Two meetings then followed, one at around 2:00 PM and the second at around 6:00 PM, in which Prime Minister A. Androutsopoulos, Foreign Minister K. Kypraios, the leader of E.D. General Bonanos and other senior officials.
Cisco stated that a war between Greece and Turkey must be prevented because of the participation of both countries in NATO. According to some confessions that were made later, at some point in these talks, Brigadier General Ioannidis threatened that if a Turkish landing occurs, war between the two countries is a foregone conclusion.
July 19
Cisco leaves Athens for Ankara
Around 11:00 admiral Arapakis ordered the submarines "Triton", "Glaukos" and "Nireus" to sail to the Romio-1, Romio-2 and Romio-3 areas, in order to be closer to Cyprus
At 13:00, the American Chargé d'Affaires Cisco returns to Athens from Ankara, where a meeting is immediately convened with the same persons who had participated in the previous one. The information he conveyed from the Turkish side seems to have been considered rather encouraging by the participants in this meeting. Later around 19:00 General Grigorios Bonanos invited all the chiefs to his office and announced to them all the information that Sisko had conveyed, who in the meantime had already left for Ankara again
The "Nixon Letter"
According to the testimony of the American diplomat James W. Spain, President Richard Nixon allegedly sent a letter to Bulent Ecevit on the eve of the Turkish invasion, corresponding to the Johnson Letter to Inonu in 1964, which he himself claims was very harder in content. As Cisco had not yet arrived in Ankara, Ambassador William B. Macomber Jr. undertook to deliver the letter. and his assistant James W. Spain. However, as soon as the American diplomats arrived at the Turkish Prime Minister's office, they overheard him on the phone with Henry Kissinger and, judging that circumstances had changed, decided not to hand over the letter they were holding.
Makarios' speech at the UN
In his speech, Makarios harshly accused the Junta of Athens, initially for planning and carrying out the coup. In addition, he claimed that he feared a military intervention by the Junta more than an intervention by Turkey, a fear which, according to him, was confirmed. In addition, he characterized the coup as an invasion by the Junta, which violated the Zurich-London treaty, which also concerns the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, he accused the Junta of duplicity and undermining the UN. He closed by saying:
"...I call on the members of the Security Council to make every possible effort to put an end to this unnatural situation, which was created with the Athens coup.
I call on the Security Council to make use of all the ways and means at its disposal, so that the constitutional order and the democratic rights of the people of Cyprus are restored without delay.
As I already mentioned, the events in Cyprus are not an internal affair of the Greek Cypriots. They also concern and affect the Turkish Cypriots.
The coup of the Greek junta is an invasion, and its consequences affect the entire Cypriot people, Greeks and Turks.
The United Nations has installed a peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Its presence cannot be effective under coup conditions. The Security Council must call on the Greek military regime to withdraw the Greek officers serving in the Cypriot National Guard and put an end to their invasion of Cyprus.
I believe, with all the evidence I have presented before you, I have given you a complete picture of the situation. I have no doubt that an appropriate decision by the Security Council will put an end to the invasion, and will restore the violated independence of Cyprus and the democratic rights of the Cypriot people."The first invasion
On July 20, Turkey, invoking Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantees, invaded Cyprus. Joseph Sisco had warned, in talks at the Pentagon in Athens, that the involvement of Greece in Cyprus would in all probability mean a total Greco-Turkish war and a possible loss of territory for Greece. On July 23, Nikos Sampson, before the looming collapse, resigned, as did the Junta of Colonels in Greece, since it was incapable of reacting militarily.
Turkey claimed that Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantees gave it the right to defend the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus. Its invasion began on July 20, 1974, a cease-fire was declared on July 22, and fighting ceased on July 23. Heavy army forces landed just before dawn in Kyrenia and met resistance (albeit delayed) from Greek and Greek Cypriot military forces. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot forces attacked Turkish Cypriot enclaves.
By the time the Security Council managed to reach a ceasefire on 22 July (Security Council resolution 353), Turkish forces had managed to control the port of Kyrenia and an elongated section between Nicosia and Kyrenia. The port of Kyrenia was important for the transfer of armaments from Turkey which would be used in the second invasion.
July 19 - Turkish warships sail
At 20:00 the image of a large armada of Turkish warships sailing from Mersina was broadcast on television. At 20:30 in Nicosia, the American ambassador sought out and visited Glaukos Clerides again asking him to replace Samson.
At 21:15 Cyprus naval radars identified six targets in formation moving in a direction from Mersina to the south. This formation was the beginning of the operation of Attila I. Shortly afterwards eight more were added to the above targets. From the recording of their course, they are said to be heading to the Cypriot region of Kormakiti, west of Kyrenia. The Greek naval commander of Cyprus, Vice Captain G. Papagiannis immediately informed the head of the National Guard. He, in turn, urgently called the head of the Armed Forces of Greece, who did not accept the aggressive nature of the targets.
The leadership of the Greek armed forces and the dictator Ioannidis were sleeping in their homes when the Turkish invasion began, in the early hours of Saturday, July 20. They had given instructions to the supervisors at GEETHA that the Turks were holding gymnasiums for extortion purposes and, despite the pleas of the commander of the National Guard, Giorgitsis, for orders to repel the invasion, the instructions called for "restraint". When Ioannidis' aide, Major Palainis, informed him that "the Turks are coming to Cyprus", the "invisible dictator" froze as he did not expect the Turkish reaction on Saturday, July 20, since the American Deputy Secretary of State was in Ankara for de-escalation talks crisis.
July 20
The Junta's Reaction - Conversations with Sisko
On July 20, US Ambassador Henry Taska went to the Pentagon to explain to the Greek military leadership the US policy as defined by Henry Kissinger. Taska took part in the leaders' meeting, and towards the end of the session Sisko, who had just arrived from Ankara, entered the room.
Cisco, the US special envoy, was blunt in his submissions and his exhortation to the Junta was:
Don't go to war with Turkey because you will lose
The only way out to avoid disaster is to get along.
If you don't listen to the United States, they will abandon you.
Sisko also emphasized that Greece should not get involved "because you will be defeated and apart from Cyprus you will also lose part of Greece". In this meeting Ioannidis exploded with anger who, after threatening that Greece would declare war on Turkey, got up and left the room telling Sisko "You deceived us".
The Junta attempted a general conscription in Greece, but this quickly proved to be a frivolous and uncoordinated action and, in the second year, it was withdrawn.
The reaction of the National Guard: Plans Afroditis 1,2,3 and the attack on the Kioneli enclave
The National Guard had two Cyprus defense plans: "Aphrodite 1" and "Aphrodite 2". Also, there was "Aphrodite 3", which was a coup plot and was successfully implemented on July 15th. "Venus 1" would be applied in the event that Cyprus was attacked by Turkey and needed to repel an attempted landing of forces.
In such a case, Greece's contribution would be:
Sending submarines to sink the landing fleet.
Air coverage of Cyprus.
Participation of ELDYK in the effort to repel the invasion.
The creation of a Turkish bridgehead was considered inevitable and the plan provided for the use of ELDYK for its destruction. According to the plan, the ELDYK "would be kept in reserve and would constitute the main counterattack force against the bridgehead that might be created (...) on the night of D/D+1", which in this case was the night of the 20th on the 21st of July.
"Aphrodite 2" would be applied in the event that the National Guard was the one to take the initiative of the movements. It envisaged taking the Turks by surprise, with liquidation operations against Turkish Cypriot enclaves throughout Cyprus. The main effort would be the dissolution of the enclave of Kioneli, which was the largest and most important and stretched between Nicosia - Agyrta, on the southern side of Pentadaktylos. ELDYK would undertake this mission.
On July 20, the leadership of the National Guard, instead of giving an order to implement the "Aphrodite 1" plan, since the initiative had been taken by the Turks and an amphibious operation was in progress, they began to implement "Aphrodite 2". Instead of attempting to clear the bridgehead in Kyrenia on the evening of July 20, the ELDYK was ordered to attack the Kioneli enclave.
The landing at Pendemili and the destruction of 2 military ships
At 01:30, the radar at Ap. Andreas detected 11 ships heading towards Kyrenia, at a distance of 35 nautical miles. At approximately 05:00, two small Greek Cypriot ships sailed from Kyrenia to engage the Turkish ships and eventually sank. All the sailors drowned except one
In the early hours of July 20, 1974, Turkish forces landed on Pendemili Beach, which is located on the northern coastline of Cyprus, about 8 kilometers west of Kyrenia. They had started from the port of Mersina, Turkey, and their original intention was to disembark at the beach of Glykiotissa, but this was deemed unsuitable. Before landing, Turkish frogmen searched for mines. The Turkish force consisted of 3,000 soldiers, 12 M47 tanks and 20 M113 armored personnel carriers, and 12 howitzers.
First involvement of the Cypriot Army
At 10:00 there was the first engagement of the Turks with forces of the land army of Cyprus (the 251st Infantry Battalion, supported by a platoon of 5 T-34 type armored vehicles). Although they managed to destroy 2 gun emplacements without recoil, they failed to dislodge the Turks from their positions. A counterattack by Turkish forces managed to destroy 2 tanks. When the battalion retreated east towards Kyrenia, the Turks advanced 1 km, first to the west, and then to the east. Out of a total of 5 tanks, 4 were destroyed and 1 was found abandoned in the battalion camp. Also, air attacks targeted Greek Cypriot positions in and around Kyrenia.
National Guard artillery bombards Turkish positions - Counter-attack attempt
The Greek Cypriot Artillery forces tried to repel the Turkish landing: the 182 MP, 190 MA/TP attacked the Turkish forces in the Panagron area and the Turkish bridgehead at Pendemili, forcing the Turkish warships to retreat. The 191 POP attacked the Turkish positions in Bella-Pais and in the Aspri Mutti and Kotza Kaya areas. The 198 POP had lost several vehicles, radios and ammunition during a fire on 16 July. Thus she found herself weakened during the first clashes with the Turks at the castle of Agios Hilarion on July 20, in her attempt to support the commando forces fighting in the area.
In response to the invasion, a National Guard staff officer, Lt. Col. Konstantinos Boufas, was sent to the western suburbs of Kyrenia in an attempt to organize a counterattack. The attack resulted in the temporary retreat of the Turks, who, however, launched a counterattack. One of the three Greek Cypriot T-34 tanks was fired upon by a Turkish anti-tank and destroyed. The 306th Infantry Battalion arrived late and attacked the Turkish forces from the east, but failed to achieve anything of note.
Mass attack of the National Guard in the enclave of Kioneli
On July 20, the National Guard, supported by all the T-34 tanks, as well as ELDYK forces - the most capable on the island - launched a massive attack on the Kioneli enclave, which controlled part of the Kyrenia-Nicosia road. In the fierce battle that followed, although ELDYK forces occupied the first houses, they were finally forced to return to their camp in the early hours of the morning.
Attacks in the enclaves of Limassol, Avdimos, Paphos, Agyrta
On July 20, at 10:00 a.m., around 450 fighters of EOKA II, members of the 203 Reserve Infantry Battalion, attacked the enclave of Limassol, where there were approximately 1,000 residents, lightly armed. At about the same time, 100 EOKA B' fighters surrounded the enclave of Avdimos, west of Limassol. The Turkish Cypriot prisoners were taken to the Limassol stadium
On July 20, 10,000 residents of the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Limassol surrendered to the Cyprus National Guard. Afterwards, according to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot eyewitnesses, rape followed and young children were executed. The Turkish Cypriot headquarters was burned and 1,300 Turkish Cypriots were placed in a concentration camp. The enclave in Famagusta was bombed and the Turkish Cypriot city of Lefka was occupied by the National Guard.
At 17:00, the Greek warship Lesvos arrived in Paphos and began shelling the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Moutallos. The boat disembarked 450 ELDYK soldiers and immediately left to avoid the enemy. Turkish ships arrived in the area to repel it, which the Turkish air force mistook for Greek and attacked them on 21 July. The pouch was delivered at 22:00.
Units of the National Guard attacked the enclave of Ayurta trying to surround and isolate it. Turkish paratroopers attempted to reinforce the enclave, but suffered several casualties.
UN Security Council Resolution 353
Late in the evening of July 20, the UN Security Council, in a unanimous resolution (numbered 353]), said:
Calls on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,
Calls upon all parties to the present conflicts as a first step to proceed with a ceasefire and recommends that all States exercise maximum restraint and refrain from any action that could further aggravate the situation,
Demands an immediate end to the foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus which is contrary to paragraph 1. as described above,
Requests the immediate withdrawal from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel located there beyond the provisions of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in the letter dated July 2, 1974,
Calls on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into talks without delay on the restoration of peace in the region and the constitutional governance of Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;
Calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to enable the implementation of its mandate,
Decides to continuously monitor the situation and to request the Secretary-General to inform it whenever necessary, with the intention of adopting further measures to ensure the restoration of peaceful conditions as soon as possible.
July 21
On July 21, while in Cyprus the fighting continued and Turkey occupied Kyrenia, in Athens Ioannidis continued to threaten an all-out war between Greece and Turkey, but when he decided to do so, the generals-chiefs of the arms revolted (known as the Generals' coup). .
The persons who starred together with Brigadier General Ioannidis were the President Phaedon Gizikis, the Prime Minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos, the Chief of the Army Lieutenant General Galatsanos, the Chief of the Navy Vice Admiral Petros Arapakis, the Chief of the Air Force Papanikolaou, the Chief of the Armed Forces Grigorios Bonanos.
Armistice talks and the "Greek convoy"
The special US negotiator for the Cyprus issue, Joseph Sisco, was trying to convince Athens and Ankara for a truce. Bulent Ecevit demanded that there be no reinforcements of the Greek forces in Cyprus in order to accept a truce. He threatened to shoot down or sink any help that would come from Greece. Sisko also informed Prime Minister Androutsopoulos. The Greek government assured that there were no Greek ships, but Ecevit believed that the Greek ships outside Paphos had raised the Turkish flag, which he bombed (the destroyer Koziatpepe was sunk, while the other two were seriously damaged).
Ioannidis decision on Greek-Turkish war
On the morning of July 21, at the meeting of the military leadership, it was decided that if the aerial bombardments did not stop, the Greek government would withdraw from NATO and declare war with Turkey. The American ambassador, Taska, when he was informed of the decision, contacted President Gizikis and informed him of the dangers.
Ioannidis decided to activate plan K, which involved sending naval and air forces to Cyprus (one submarine, two torpedo boats and a squadron of 18 F-84F aircraft from Crete)
The generals' coup
Ioannidis called the president Gizikis, the head of the Armed Forces Grigorio Bonano, the prime minister Androutsopoulos and the minister of defense Latsoudis and informed them of his decision. Bonanos accepted it on the condition that the heads of the branches of the Army accept it. Immediately after, he called the chiefs and vice-chiefs of the Air Force and Navy. All the generals expressed reservations about whether Greece could withstand a war with Turkey, (which had a concentrated army in Smyrna) while they also feared an attack from the North (Bulgaria). So they refused to declare war.
After the end of the meeting, the Chief of the Armed Forces, Grigorios Bonanos, Vice Admiral Arapakis, the Chief of the Air Force Papanikolaou and the Chief of the Ground Forces Galatsanos participated in a long discussion, the decision of which was to distance themselves from Dimitrios Ioannidis as well as hand over the power to politicians. After the meeting, Arapakis called on the Nereus and Glaukos submarines, which had been moving towards Cyprus since July 19, to return to the Aegean.
Sending aid from Greece to Cyprus
In the afternoon, in Athens, Ioannidis together with the military leaders discussed in a new meeting the sending of reinforcements to Cyprus. The military, unable to come into open conflict with Ioannidis, citing security issues, did not give approval for the use of what was planned in Plan K. Finally it was decided to secretly send reinforcements to the Greek Cypriots, in the form of an infantry division, a commando battalion and of a medium tank battalion. An initial attempt to transport the reinforcements was made using the ferry "Rethymnon", which carried the 537th Infantry Battalion, a battalion of tanks and 500 (according to others 280) Cypriot volunteers (mainly students, supporters of EOKA B΄), who collected by the junta-dominated EFEKA). The ferry left Piraeus at midnight. Finally, after a journey as far as Paphos, he turned around, disembarked the Soldiers at Rhodes and returned the volunteers to Piraeus, since the military leaders were in communication with Joseph Sisko.
Operation Niki (transportation of a commando battalion to Cyprus)
That same afternoon, the Hellenic Air Force attempted a covert transfer of reinforcements (in the form of a sortie battalion), known as Operation "Victory", using 15 Nord Noratlas (354 Pegasus Squadron) aircraft from Souda, Crete to Cyprus. However, the mission received friendly fire from the anti-aircraft machine guns of the Greek Cypriot 195 MEA/AP because it mistook the aircraft for Turkish ones (lined up at Nicosia International Airport), resulting in the destruction of the 3rd Noratlas (NIKI-4) (4 airmen and 29 commandos killed). Two more Noratlas aircraft were seriously damaged and made abnormal landings, as a result of which the Greek Cypriots realized their mistake. Some of the remaining aircraft managed to land safely and unload men and equipment so that the Greeks were able to protect the airfield.
Last battles in Cyprus and a second wave of supplies to the Turkish forces
There was little or no fighting on the bridgehead on 21 July, while Turkish forces had departed from the port of Mersina. The Greek Cypriot forces lined up in Kyrenia, on the Kyrenia-Karava road and in Trimithi. Clashes continued at Pentadaktylos and the Greek Cypriot forces captured the village of Pileri, while the 31st and 33rd Assault Squadrons had significant successes.
At 6:00 in the morning, the enclave of Limassol was completely surrendered, 1,000 prisoners of war were taken to the central stadium of the city. There were reports of rapes of women and murders of children.
In the enclave of Larnaca, after fierce fighting, the Turkish Cypriots began to surrender at 10:30.
At 04:45, Greek Cypriot forces attacked the enclave of Lefka, with bombardment and rockets, and Limnitis was surrounded by National Guard forces.
July 22
Armistice on the afternoon of July 22
Between midnight of July 21 and 22, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's representative brokered an armistice between the two belligerents, which was reached in the early afternoon (4:00 pm) of July 22. After the weakening of Ioannidis, Bonanos took responsibility for not getting involved in the Greek-Turkish war.
Fall of Kyrenia
On 22 July, the transfer of Turkish supplies from Mersina was completed. Reinforced with heavy weaponry, the attack began on Kyrenia, which was almost empty as the inhabitants had moved to Agios Hilarion for safety. The Turkish forces, with air and naval support, launched the attack shortly after 11 am, against commando and infantry forces (33rd MK, 306TP and 251TP) which without anti-tank cover were impossible to effectively resist. By the end of the day, a strong bridgehead had been established in Kyrenia.
Occupation of pockets of Famagusta
With the help of the artillery, the attack against the pockets of the Turkish Cypriots in Sakkaria, Karaolou and the old city of Famagusta was completed. The Turkish air force bombed the rest of the city.
Nicosia Airport and Agios Hilarion
At 15:00, the Turkish air force launched a powerful attack against the Nicosia airport. The ceasefire announced at 16:00 was broken shortly after, by renewed shelling at 17:15. Ground forces were involved in Dikomos, at 18:15, and also in the village of Trachona. An attack was also carried out on the enclave of Agios Hilarion, until a truce was declared.
July 23
The military-political meeting
On July 23, in the Old Palace, the politicians and the Hundred military began to discuss. From the politicians, P. Kanellopoulos, G. Mavros, Sp. Markezinis, G. A. Novas, St. Stefanopoulos, P. Garoufalias, Xen. Zolotas and E. Averof. From the military, present were the president of the junta Republic, general F. Gizikis, the head of the Armed Forces, general Gr. Bonanos, the head of the Greek Armed Forces, lieutenant general Andr. Galatsanos, the head of ΓEN vice-admiral Petros Arapakis and the head of ΓEA Al. Papanikolaou. No minutes were kept for the meeting. It was decided to give power to Konstantinos Karamanlis.
Battles in Cyprus
The A Squadron managed to break into Nicosia airport. The Turkish forces that sought to capture it after heavy fighting failed to advance.
July 24
On July 24, a government of National Unity was sworn in in Athens, with Konstantinos Karamanlis as prime minister. At the same time in Cyprus, events forced Samson to resign. Glaukos Cleridis took over as president.
July 25
On July 25, 1974, the peace talks for Cyprus began in Geneva, between the Foreign Ministers of the three guarantor countries of the Republic of Cyprus (Georgios Mavros, Turan Gunes, James Callahan).
Account of the First Invasion (Attila I)
By the end of Attila I, Turkish forces controlled 7% of Cyprus. They had managed to connect their bridgehead with the large enclave of Kioneli, north of Nicosia. They controlled the port of Kyrenia, which allowed them to increase the supply rates of their forces. The port of Kyrenia was important for the transfer of armaments from Turkey which would be used in the second invasion.
According to Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, as of July 25, they had 15 soldiers dead, 184 wounded and 242 missing. Turkish Cypriot losses were unknown. According to the Greek Cypriot side, between July 20 and 22, the Greek forces had 215 dead, 223 missing and an unknown number of wounded. According to the Red Cross, the prisoners of war of the first invasion were 385 Greek Cypriots sent to Adana, 63 Greek Cypriots in Saray prison and 3,268 Turkish Cypriots in various locations in Cyprus.
The negotiations in Geneva
Negotiations July 25-30 (Ministry from Greece, Turkey, England)
On July 25, at the initiative of England, peace talks began in Geneva, Switzerland, with the participation of the foreign ministers of the three guarantor countries (Mavros, Gunes, Callahan). The talks lasted 5 days. On July 30, a declaration was signed calling on "the opposing forces in Cyprus to cease all aggressive or hostile activity". The main points of the declaration were:
The non-expansion of the areas that the opposing forces had under their control.
The establishment of safety zones between the belligerents
The evacuation of Turkish enclaves by the UN Peacekeeping Force
The right for both sides to have their own police and security forces
The holding of negotiations with the participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for a definitive settlement of the Cypriot conflict, on August 8.
Negotiations August 8-14 (Cliridis-Dektas)
On August 8, the talks were repeated in Geneva, this time with the participation of the representatives of the Greek Cypriot community (Glavkos Cleridis) and the Turkish Cypriot community (Rauf Denktas). The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turan Gunes, requested that the Greek side accept federalization and population separation with 34% of the territory controlled by the Turkish Cypriots. Glaukos Cleridis persistently asked for a postponement of the talks, in order to give him time (36 to 48 hours) to consult with the Greek and Cypriot political leadership. Late in the evening of August 13, Gounes claimed that the Greek Cypriots were playing games with time and that Clerides had to respond immediately or the talks would collapse. On the dawn of August 14, Turkey launched a new major military operation. The second round of the Turkish invasion had begun.
Resolution 573 from the Council of Europe in favor of Turkey
On July 29, the Council of Europe passed Resolution 573 condemning the July 15 coup in Cyprus and recognizing Turkey's right to intervene to restore the pre-coup regime, in accordance with Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantees.
Fighting in Cyprus during the ceasefire (July 25 - August 14)
During the truce, the Turkish forces continued their advance in the province of Kyrenia, occupying Lapithos and Karavas. On July 24, Turkish forces occupied the village of Agios Ermolaos, which was recaptured on the 27th by the National Guard forces, who retreated on July 28 after heavy fighting.
On August 1, heavy fighting broke out in Karavas, with the National Guard destroying a Turkish tank. On 6 August, the Turkish Armed Forces attacked Karava and Lapithos to capture them on 8 August. With these battles, the Turkish forces doubled the territory they controlled.
The second invasion
On August 14, the second operation of the Turks (Attila II) began, which lasted 3 days, while members of EOKA II carried out massacres of civilians and women and children in the villages of Maratha, Santalari and Aloa, which the United Nations described as a crime against of humanity.. The Turks would conquer more than they asked for in Geneva a few hours ago.
The Greek Cypriot forces were divided into 3 sectors, Western, Central and Eastern. The plan of the Greek Cypriot forces was weak defense and retreat to a pre-planned defensive line, the "Troodos Line". The most strengthened sector was the Eastern, for which there was the opinion that it would be the main field of action of the Turkish aggression. In total, there were 20 thousand men in the ranks of the National Guard and 21 T-34 tanks.
In the Turkish forces there were 40 thousand men and 200-260 tanks. The Turkish plan had two phases. East to attack until they joined the Famagusta enclave with the remaining forces they controlled, while another group of forces would advance west until they approached the Troodos Line. The second phase, expected to begin after two days, provided for the capture of Morphou and Limnitis.
In the diplomatic field, on August 15 Cleridis presided over a council of Greek Cypriots and the next day he went to Athens for talks with the Greek government.
August 14
Eastern Sector
In the Eastern Sector, the Turks started with artillery shots, assisted by the air force, against the Greek positions. Turkish forces attacked the village of Mia Milia. They were initially repulsed, but after being reinforced with armored personnel carriers, the GEF ordered the Greek Cypriot forces to retreat to the Troodos line. Thus the Turks managed to occupy the village. Retreating, the Greek Cypriot forces were receiving air force fire, which led to the collapse of the defense line and by 12:30, the Turkish forces had reached Famagusta.
Central Sector - Battle of ELDYK
In the Central Sector, the ELDYK camp was attacked by artillery and air force fire. At 10:00 the camp was attacked by infantry and at 11:00 by armored forces, but the ELDYK forces - the most combat-worthy unit of the Greek Cypriot forces - managed to repel them. At 15:00 there was another attack, but again it was repelled. In total, ELDYK had 1 dead and 7 wounded, while the Turkish losses were heavy. However they succeeded and captured an adjacent hill.
In the Western sector there were no particular engagements.
15th of August
Meeting of political and religious leaders of Cyprus
In a meeting convened by Cleridis, on August 14, to present the Turkish demands for a federation. The political and religious leaders (and the deposed metropolitans) and Nikos Sampson participated. Cleridis described the situation to them, informed them that the Turks can occupy all of Cyprus. This was followed by the positions of the political leaders. Samson proposed to rally the leadership under Glaukos Clerides. Several metropolitans demanded that a union with Greece be declared. At the end of the meeting, Cleridis stated that he will act in accordance with the national interest and assumes responsibility.
Military operations
In the Eastern Sector, on August 15, the 341st reserve battalion, reinforced with 3 T-34 tanks, was trying to defend west of Famagusta. The other forces retreated to Larnaca and the Troodos Line. At 14:00 the Greek Cypriots of the battalion saw the Turkish three armored vehicles approaching, and realizing that they were isolated, retreated at 17:00. The first Turkish tanks entered Famagusta at 17:30. They joined the Turkish Cypriot enclave there, but did not advance to the Greek Cypriot areas.
In the Western Sector, Turkish forces attacked the Greek Cypriots at 14:30. They advanced 6 kilometers to the west, and on the night of August 15-16, the Greek Cypriot forces were ordered to retreat to the Troodos Line
In the Central Sector there were no particular clashes.
August 16
In the Eastern Sector there were no particular conflicts. In the Central Sector, the Turkish Air Force began bombing positions around the ELDYK camp at 8:30 am. Turkish forces, supported by armor and artillery, approached the camp to within 800 meters. At 13:00 the Greek Cypriot artillery stopped providing support to the ELDYK forces. The Greek forces then retreated and at 13:30 the camp fell into the hands of the Turks. ELDYK had lost 80 men, 22 were wounded and 5 were missing. The Turkish forces also had a heavy account of losses.
In the Western Sector, the Greek Cypriot forces retreated to the Troodos Line. The Turks advanced and at 12:30 occupied Morphou and Limnitis, at 18:00 when a ceasefire was implemented by the United Nations. But because by then the Turkish troops had not reached the Troodos Line, the fighting continued on August 17 with the Turks being victorious. In the Western Sector, many Greek Cypriots had deserted.
August 19, assassination of the American ambassador in Nicosia
On August 19, there were massive anti-American demonstrations in Cyprus. The Cypriot people were furious about the role of the Anglo-Americans and NATO in the crime against Cyprus, the coup and the Turkish invasion. The demonstrators were shouting slogans against the USA, the CIA, NATO, the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others. At some point there was a flurry of gunfire (the information said it was gunmen from EOKA B') and then the embassy guards, American marines, threw tear gas at the protesters and started shooting in the air. The American ambassador, Roger Davis, and his secretary, Antoinette Varnava, were killed by stray bullets. No one was arrested for the murders, 3 years later 2 people were tried and imprisoned for disorderly conduct and illegal carrying of weapons that day.
Start of talks for a solution to the Cyprus problem
On August 25, at the initiative of the UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, the talks for a solution to the Cyprus issue resumed. The Turkish Cypriot side wanted federalization with population exchange, while Glavkos Cleridis was ready to accept federation but without population exchange. Finally, in August 1975, an agreement was reached which is known as the Third Vienna Agreement. The Turkish Cypriot interpretation maintains the view that this is a population exchange agreement, while the Greek Cypriot interpretation maintains that it was a temporary humanitarian measure. Talks for a solution to the Cyprus problem continue to this day.
Atrocities and crimes against humanity
Against Greek Cypriots
Human rights violations
Turkey was found guilty by the European Commission of Human Rights of population displacement, deprivation of the right to liberty, ill-treatment, deprivation of the right to life and deprivation of the right to property. The Turkish policy of violent displacement of a third of the Greek Cypriot population from their homes in the occupied north, preventing their return and settlement by Turks constitutes ethnic cleansing.
In 1976 and again in 1983, the European Commission of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of continuous violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. Turkey has been condemned for preventing the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes and properties.
Οι εγκλωβισμένοι Ελληνοκύπριοι στην Καρπασία το 1975 είχαν υποβληθεί σε καταπάτηση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων τους για αυτό και το 2001 όταν το Ευρωπαϊκό δικαστήριο ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων βρήκε την Τουρκία ένοχη για παραβίαση 14 άρθρων της Ευρωπαϊκής σύμβασης ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων στην απόφαση της Κύπρου εναντίον της Τουρκίας (25781/94), λιγότεροι από 600 είχαν μέχρι τότε παραμείνει.
The European Commission of Human Rights, by 12 votes to 1, accepted evidence from the Republic of Cyprus regarding the rape of Greek Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers and the torture of Greek Cypriot prisoners during the invasion.[
Rapes of Greek Cypriots
During the invasion, Greek Cypriot women were raped by Turkish soldiers. The number of rapes was so great that a large number of unwanted pregnancies were also caused, which forced the conservative Orthodox Church of Cyprus to temporarily allow abortions. Rape was used by the Turkish military to clear areas of civilians, forcing them to flee.
Against Turkish Cypriots
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