The Battle of the Granicus, May 22, 334 BC
Opposing Alexander was a strong and concentrated army of the Achaemenid Empire, composed primarily of the forces from the western satrapies, which had taken positions near the city of Zeleia in Phrygia. Leading the Persian troops was Arsites, satrap of Phrygia, supported by prominent Persian aristocrats and officials such as Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Pharnaces, brother of Darius III's wife, Atizyes, Mithridates, and other distinguished generals and regional rulers.
Alexander’s victory in the battle was not merely a local military success but provided a strategically significant advantage for the further advance of the Greek forces into Asia Minor. It enhanced the prestige of the Macedonian king both in the eyes of the Persians and among the Greek cities of Ionia, causing fractures within the internal front of Achaemenid control.
Initial Crucial Decisions of the Macedonian Campaign – Preparation for the Battle
Had the Persians mobilized their fleet in time towards the Hellespont, they might have been able from the outset to prevent the advance of the Macedonian army and suppress Alexander’s threat on the shores of Asia Minor. However, during the early stages of the Macedonian campaign, the Persians made serious strategic errors. At the moment of Alexander’s landing on the Asian coast, a significant Achaemenid force was already assembled there.
The figure of Memnon of Rhodes, an experienced general in Persian service, is of particular importance. He presented a defensive strategy of long-term strategic value. Memnon urged the Persian leaders to avoid any direct confrontation with Alexander. Instead, he proposed a scorched earth policy, i.e., the deliberate destruction of the regions through which the Macedonian forces would pass, in order to deprive them of supplies and support. At the same time, he suggested transferring the war to Greece itself by dispatching a powerful military force with the Persian fleet. The objective was twofold: to threaten Alexander in his homeland and to create a diversion by reigniting conflicts within the Greek mainland, especially in southern Greece, south of Thermopylae.
Memnon’s proposals were not heeded, mainly due to political considerations and internal rivalries within the Persian administration. The Persians ultimately decided to confront Alexander in open battle, choosing to block him on the banks of the Granicus River.
Upon learning of the Persian troop deployment, Alexander ordered his army to prepare for a frontal engagement. Upon arriving at the battlefield, he observed that the Persians had taken position on the steep eastern bank of the river—a naturally advantageous location. The Granicus, though a small river originating from the mountains of Lesser Phrygia, had a width of between 20 and 40 meters at that particular point. The seasonal melting of snow in May had strengthened its current, making the flow powerful; however, its depth did not necessitate the construction of a bridge for crossing.
The most difficult challenge for the attacking army was the rugged terrain of the eastern bank, which the Persians held. The ground was steep and inaccessible, making any ascent particularly hazardous under enemy fire. Nevertheless, Alexander decided to attack the enemy position immediately, opting for a bold and surprise river crossing—a move that would ultimately determine the outcome of the battle.
The Deployment of Opposing Forces at the Battle of the Granicus
Before the engagement, Parmenion, an experienced general of the Macedonian army, advised Alexander to postpone the battle. A nighttime confrontation on unfamiliar terrain, with the enemy holding the high ground on the eastern bank, seemed too risky. However, Alexander, after assessing the disposition of the Persian army, judged that an immediate set-piece battle offered the best chance of success. He resolved not to give the Persians the slightest opportunity to retreat or reorganize during the night.
According to his orders, the center of the Macedonian line was held by six phalanx battalions under the command of Perdiccas, Coenus, Amyntas, Philip, Meleager, and Craterus. On the right wing of the phalanx were deployed the hypaspists under Nicanor, son of Parmenion, followed by the sarissophoroi, the Paeonians, and the squadron of allied cavalry from Apollonia, led by Socrates, under the overall command of Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus. They were supported by allied forces, archers, and Agrianian javelineers under the leadership of Philotas, forming the right flank. The left wing was protected by three cavalry units: first the Thracians under Agathon, followed by the allied cavalry under Philip son of Menelaus, and finally the Thessalian cavalry under Callas son of Harpalus. Alexander himself commanded the right flank, while he entrusted the command of the left to Parmenion.
On the eastern bank of the river, the Persian cavalry was arrayed along the entire riverfront. On their right wing stood the Medes and Bactrians under Rheomithres; on the left, Memnon with his sons and the cavalry of Arsamenes; in the center, the Paphlagonians and Hyrcanians, commanded by Arsites and Spithridates. The Persian, Asian, and Greek infantry had been deployed a short distance to the rear in reserve positions, as the Persians had chosen to focus their defense on repelling the river crossing with the strength of their cavalry.
The Persian tactical force numbered approximately 20,000 cavalry, consisting of Medes, Bactrians, Hyrcanians, Cappadocians, and Paphlagonians, and an equal number of infantry, mainly Greek mercenaries. Despite their numerical superiority in cavalry, their infantry was inferior to that of the Macedonians, at least according to Arrian. He estimates the Persian force at around 40,000 men, while other, more exaggerated accounts raise the number to 110,000 or even 600,000, as reported by Justin.
The deployment of both sides reflects their contrasting strategic approaches: Alexander opted for a bold, offensive plan, grounded in the discipline and cohesion of his phalanx and cavalry, while the Persians relied primarily on the strength and mass of their cavalry, underestimating the determination and brilliance of the young Macedonian commander.
The Commencement of the Battle – The First Crossing of the Granicus
According to the precise account of Arrian [9], the two opposing armies stood silently for a long time, facing each other across the riverbanks, immersed in tense anticipation of what was to come. The Persians patiently awaited the moment when the Macedonians would enter the water, intending to strike them at the height of their vulnerability.
Then, Alexander, springing resolutely onto Bucephalus, called upon his army to follow him and show its valor. He ordered the advance cavalry to cross the river first, followed by the Paeonians under Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus, an infantry battalion, and—at the forefront of all—the squadron of Socrates, which, by fortunate coincidence, commanded the entirety of the cavalry that day under Ptolemy, son of Philip.
Alexander himself, leading the right wing, charged into the current to the sound of trumpets and the battle cries to Enyalius Ares. He advanced at an angle, letting the current guide him diagonally, so that once he reached the opposite bank, he could strike head-on, rather than in scattered formation against the Persian cavalry arrayed in line.
The Persians, seeing the first men of Amyntas and Socrates emerge, unleashed fierce volleys of spears. Those positioned on the higher ground hurled their weapons into the river, while those stationed lower descended into the water themselves. The cavalry clash in the river’s shallows was fierce; the Macedonians, fighting from unstable footing, suffered significant losses, while the Persians exploited their advantageous elevation.
At the most critical point stood the elite Persian cavalry, where Memnon and his sons were engaged in the fighting. Nevertheless, the leading Macedonian troops mounted a brave defense, buying time for the rest of the forces to rally around the advancing Alexander. The king, leading the right formation, struck with force at the densest part of the Persian line, where their commanders were concentrated.
Meanwhile, the Macedonian phalanx units were now crossing one after another. Although the clash took place on horseback, it bore the character of infantry combat; the animals pressed against one another, the men fought hand-to-hand, the Macedonians pushing to drive the Persians down from the steep hill to the plain, while the Persians resisted, trying to hurl their opponents back into the river.
Thus, the curtain rose on the Battle of the Granicus: with a bold and sudden crossing, in which Alexander’s resolve and the discipline of his men triumphed over the Persians’ numerical superiority and strong defensive position—foreshadowing the Macedonian victory to come.
The Climax of the Battle – Alexander’s Personal Feat of Arms and the Rout of the Persians
As the battle raged fiercely, Alexander’s spear broke during the charge. He immediately called for another weapon from Aretas, a young nobleman of the royal retinue. Aretas, however, found himself in similar difficulty—his own spear already shattered, he was fighting with the broken shaft. Pointing to it, he cried out for Alexander to turn elsewhere. At last, one of the allies, Demaratus the Corinthian, handed Alexander his own weapon, and without delay, the king leapt back into the fray.
At that moment, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, was seen approaching, leading a cavalry detachment with the aim of breaking through the Macedonian lines. The king charged straight at him, spear in hand, and with a decisive thrust, ran him through. Shortly after, Rhoesaces launched an attack and managed to strike Alexander on the head with his scimitar, splitting his helmet. Unshaken, Alexander retaliated with a spear thrust to the chest, piercing the man’s cuirass and felling him.
Meanwhile, Spithridates, having approached unseen from behind, raised his scimitar to deliver a fatal blow. But at the last instant, Cleitus, known as the Black, intervened and struck the Persian’s shoulder, severing his arm and saving the king's life.
Confusion now began to overtake the Persian camp. The Persians, together with their horses, were being assaulted from all sides—spears, swords, and cavalry intermingled with light infantry drove them back with brutal force. The rout began at the point where Alexander was engaged, and as the center collapsed, both flanks disintegrated and fell into disorderly retreat.
Around one thousand Persian cavalrymen were killed in the engagement. Nonetheless, the pursuit of the fugitives was not extensive, as Alexander turned his focus to the dense formation of Greek mercenaries, who had held their ground, stunned by the unexpected turn of the battle.
The king ordered the phalanx to attack them head-on while the cavalry encircled them. The clash ended swiftly and bloodily; nearly all were slaughtered, save for those who may have hidden among the dead. Around two thousand were taken prisoner.
The Battle of the Granicus was sealed with the deaths of many distinguished Persian leaders: Niphates, Petines, Spithridates the satrap of Lydia, Mithrobuzanes, governor of Cappadocia, Mithridates, Darius’ son-in-law, Arbupales, son of Darius (descended from Artaxerxes), Pharnaces, Darius’ brother-in-law, and Omarus, commander of the mercenaries. Arsites, one of the chief Persian commanders, fled to Phrygia, where, overwhelmed by guilt for the defeat, he took his own life.
According to the account of historian Peter Green, the Battle of the Granicus was actually composed of two successive engagements. Based on the testimonies of Diodorus and Ptolemy the Bodyguard, he contends that the Macedonians reached the river in the late afternoon. Parmenion, citing strategic prudence, advised delay, but Alexander, with his characteristic impetuosity, ordered an immediate attack and charged at the head of the Royal Squadron. This first assault, disorganized and hasty, was repelled. The few who fell in that encounter were honored with statues precisely because they alone had charged, while many others hesitated. The victorious outcome came the following morning, with the historic assault that shattered the Persian camp and laid the foundations for Alexander’s advance into Asia.
After the Battle – Honours, Burials, and Alexander’s Political Conduct
Following the glorious victory over the Persian army at the Granicus River, Alexander, demonstrating due reverence for his fallen comrades, took a series of actions that revealed not only his military acumen but also his deep sensitivity to bravery and self-sacrifice.
During the initial assault, twenty-five allied soldiers were killed. In their memory, the Macedonian king commissioned the renowned Lysippos—the only sculptor permitted to portray Alexander himself—to create bronze statues. These works of art were erected in the sacred grove of Dion, a revered place for the Macedonians where the gods and heroes of the nation were honored. In total, the number of the fallen included about sixty cavalrymen and thirty infantrymen; they were all buried the next day, along with their weapons and personal belongings, in accordance with the Greek warrior tradition of honoring the dead.
As a tangible tribute to the fallen, Alexander exempted their families—parents and children—from taxation on land and property, as well as from all forms of personal obligation to the state. This gesture carried both symbolic and practical significance: it preserved the memory of the heroes and eased the burden on the households they left behind.
Alexander also devoted particular care to the wounded. He personally visited each one, inspected the state of their injuries, inquired about when and how they had been wounded, and encouraged them to recount their feats of valor—thus offering not only medical attention, but also moral uplift and recognition.
Even toward his enemies, Alexander did not neglect the measure of dignity. The Persian commanders, as well as the Greek mercenaries who had fought on the side of the barbarians, were buried—an act reflecting the distinction between honorable enemy and traitor. The Greek mercenaries taken alive were sent in chains to Macedonia and sentenced to forced labor. The motivation was not purely military but profoundly political: these men, as Greeks, had violated the common resolutions of the Greek city-states by fighting for the barbarians against the shared interests of the Hellenic world.
As a culmination of the victory and to express its pan-Hellenic symbolism, Alexander sent three hundred Persian suits of armor to Athens as a dedication to the Acropolis, in the sanctuary of Athena. He ordered an inscription to be engraved, clearly stating the national meaning of the campaign:
“Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks—except the Lacedaemonians—from the barbarians who dwell in Asia.”
This phrase did more than commemorate a victory; it served as a manifesto of Greek cultural superiority over the barbarians, and a pointed rebuke to the Spartans, who, through their neutrality—or even opposition—to pan-Hellenic unity, were explicitly excluded from the collective term “Greeks” in the inscription.
Thus, the victory at Granicus was not merely a military success, but a milestone of national solidarity, political messaging, and royal magnanimity.
Consequences and Conclusions
This first strategically significant victory of Alexander at the Granicus River was not merely a military feat; it served as the harbinger of his long and unrelenting advance toward the conquest of Asia Minor. By solidifying his reputation among both allies and adversaries, this victory provided him with firm ground and freedom of maneuver for further advances to the south—before the Persians had the chance to regroup or mobilize their Phoenician fleet, a force of decisive importance for maintaining control over the Aegean and safeguarding mainland Greece itself.
Through the Battle of the Granicus, Alexander not only dealt a decisive blow to the local Persian forces, but also preempted their response. Surprise, boldness, and speed were his primary tools. Before the satraps of Asia Minor could coordinate, before reinforcements could arrive from King Darius, and even before the Phoenician navy—which posed a real threat to Greece—could be deployed, Alexander had already broken through the first defensive front of the Persian Empire.
This victory boosted the morale of the Greek allies, impressed the Hellenic world, and made it clear that the campaign was not to be defensive, but offensive and decisive. From Granicus onward, the campaign evolved into a pan-Hellenic crusade under Alexander’s leadership—aimed at avenging the Persian invasions of the past and asserting Greek power in the East.
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